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Recent Decisions
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FOURTH CIRCUIT
BROWN v. HOVATTER: ANNOUNCING THE DEATH OF RIGHTS
FOR OUT-OF-STATE PARTIES IN FOURTH CIRCUIT
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
LAUREN C. GENVERT*
In Brown v. Hovatter,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit relied upon a very narrow interpretation of dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence to hold, in favor of the State, that
the Maryland Morticians and Funeral Directors Act2 did not violate
the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution in prohibit-
ing funeral homes established after 1945 from operating in the corpo-
rate form.3  The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the Act’s implication of
services rather than goods made it an unlikely candidate for dormant
Commerce Clause protection, and that it further failed to violate Ma-
ryland’s balancing test or to necessitate the use of the discrimination
test.4  In failing to properly apply the United States Supreme Court’s
established three-part inquiry for cases implicating a state’s alleged in-
fringement upon interstate commerce, the Hovatter court disregarded
precedent and significantly limited the reach of the dormant Com-
merce Clause.5  By doing so, the court failed to recognize the Act’s
blatant discrimination against the rights of those the dormant Com-
merce Clause was designed to protect and the out-of-state interests
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1. 561 F.3d 357 (4th Cir. 2009).
2. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. §§ 7-101–7-602 (LexisNexis 2009).
3. Hovatter, 561 F.3d at 359–60.
4. Id. at 363–64.
5. See infra Part IV.A.
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unable to lobby on their own behalf.6  If the Hovatter court had prop-
erly applied a broad interpretation of the Court’s balancing test, it
would have appropriately concluded that the Act is unconstitutional
and would have refrained from creating such dangerous precedent.7
I. THE CASE
Charles Brown, Brian Chisholm, Joseph B. Jenkins, III, and Gail
Manuel (“plaintiffs”) brought suit against David Hovatter, President of
the Maryland State Board of Morticians (“Board”), and multiple mem-
bers of the Board in their official capacities (collectively “defend-
ants”).8  The plaintiffs alleged that sections of the Maryland
Morticians and Funeral Directors Act9 requiring that owners be li-
censed by the Board10 and prohibiting the grant of new corporate
licenses11 violated their rights under Article I, Section 8, and the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 28 U.S.C. § 2201.12
A. The Language of the Act
The Maryland Morticians and Funeral Directors Act (“Maryland
Morticians Act” or “Act”) seeks to “protect the health and welfare of
the public” by creating a comprehensive regulatory scheme for the
funeral home industry in the State of Maryland.13  The Act is enforced
by the State Board of Morticians.14  Under the current version of the
Act, as amended in 1971, a funeral home must receive a license from
the State Board of Morticians prior to commencing business,15 which
6. See infra Part IV.B.
7. See infra Part IV.C.
8. Brown v. Hovatter, 516 F. Supp. 2d 547, 549 (D. Md. 2007).  Specifically, the plain-
tiffs sued Board members Faye Peterson, Michael Ruck, Sr., Gladys Sewell, Donald V. Borg-
wardt, Marshall Jones, Jr., Michael Kruger, Brian Haight, Robert Bradshaw, Jeffery Pope,
and Vernon Strayhorn, Sr. Id.
9. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. §§ 7-101–7-602 (LexisNexis 2009).
10. Id. § 7-310.
11. Id. § 7-309(a)–(b).
12. Hovatter, 516 F. Supp. 2d at 549.  The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive
relief against the defendants. Id.  The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, alleging the following: (1) Section 7-310 of the Maryland statute vio-
lates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses as it only allows “licensed individuals”
to own funeral homes; and (2) Section 7-309(a) violates the Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion Clauses and the dormant Commerce Clause. Hovatter, 516 F. Supp. 2d at 555 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
13. Hovatter, 516 F. Supp. 2d at 550 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mary-
land Morticians Act § 7-103).
14. Id. (citing Maryland Morticians Act §§ 7-201–7-205).
15. Id.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\69-4\MLR405.txt unknown Seq: 3 25-AUG-10 12:00
2010] BROWN V. HOVATTER 985
requires that a “licensed individual” who is also “the owner or co-
owner of the establishment to be licensed” sign the application.16  To
receive licensure as a mortician, one must do three things: (1) com-
plete an associate of arts degree, (2) complete a one- or two-year ap-
prenticeship under a licensed Maryland mortician, and (3) pass both
the American Board of Funeral Service Education national examina-
tion and a Maryland law and regulations examination.17
Since 1945, the Maryland General Assembly has prohibited the
State Board of Morticians from granting corporate rights to appli-
cants.18  Those Maryland owners who possessed corporate ownership
as of June 1, 1945, however, may continue to hold such status so long
as they have continuously renewed their license since that date and
pay all required fees.19  The corporate rights are also transferable,
without any apparent restrictions upon state residence or whether the
purchaser is a “licensed individual” within the meaning of Section 7-
310(b)(2), and there is no existing sunset provision on the title; thus,
all of the currently existing corporate funeral homes in the State of
Maryland may be sold to another owner indefinitely.20  Maryland and
New Hampshire are the only two states that currently employ restric-
tions upon corporate ownership.21
16. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Maryland Morticians Act § 7-
310(b)(2)).  The term “licensed individual” originally encompassed four categories of peo-
ple: (1) a licensed mortician; (2) a licensed funeral director; (3) a surviving spouse of a
deceased mortician or funeral director; or (4) a personal representative of an estate of a
deceased mortician.  Maryland Morticians Act §§ 7-302, -307, -308, -308.1.  To obtain a sur-
viving spouse license, the applicant need only pass the Board-administered Maryland State
law examination. Id. § 7-308(b).  The executor license is valid for only six months and has
no examination requirements; however, the business can only be operated “under the di-
rect supervision of a licensed mortician or funeral director.” Id. § 7-308.1.
17. Hovatter, 516 F. Supp. 2d at 550 (citing Maryland Morticians Act § 7-303(b)).
18. Id. at 550–51 (citing Maryland Morticians Act § 7-309(a)–(b)).  The Act currently
provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, a corporation may not operate a
mortuary science business and the [State Board of Morticians] may not issue a license to or
list any corporation as licensed to operate a mortuary science business.”  Maryland Morti-
cians Act § 7-309(a).
19. Hovatter, 516 F. Supp. 2d at 551 (citing Maryland Morticians Act § 7-309(b)).  Prior
to 1937, there were no restrictions upon the corporate ownership of funeral homes in
Maryland. Id. at 551 n.7 (citation omitted).  In that year, however, the Maryland General
Assembly amended the Act to prohibit the Board from granting any further corporate
licenses. Id. (citation omitted).  Eight years later, in 1945, the Maryland General Assembly
granted corporate licenses to those licensed Maryland funeral directors “engaged in the
business of funeral directing or embalming at the time of induction into the Armed Forces
of the United States during World War II.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
20. Id. at 551.
21. Id. at 551–52.  The New Hampshire Code states that “[n]o corporation . . . shall be
issued a license as a funeral director,” but excludes from its prohibition those “licensed
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In 2007, within the State of Maryland, there were 283 licensed
funeral homes.22  Of those 283, corporations owned 58, surviving
spouses held 11, and licensed morticians or funeral directors held the
remaining 214.23  Because of the relative rarity of corporate licenses
within Maryland, the existing licenses are very valuable and are esti-
mated at $150,000 to $200,000, excluding assets.24
B. The Plaintiffs’ Challenge of the Act
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland
heard the case on cross-motions for summary judgment, granting the
plaintiffs’ motion as to Sections 7-309(a)–(b), addressing corporate
ownership, and the defendants’ motion as to Section 7-310, creating a
licensing scheme for funeral home operators.25  Because the Mary-
land General Assembly could have rationally decided that Section 7-
310 of the Act furthers the legitimate purpose of protecting the “pub-
lic’s health, safety and welfare,” the court reasoned that it does not
violate the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of the United
States Constitution.26
In reaching this conclusion, the district court noted that Sections
7-309(a)–(b) failed to implicate either a fundamental right or a sus-
pect classification, and under a rational basis review, the Maryland
General Assembly could have found it rational to “require the pres-
ence of licensed individuals in the ownership structure of a corpora-
tion practicing mortuary science.”27  The district court, in so
prior to January 1, 1953.” N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 325:15 (LexisNexis 2003).  Pennsylvania,
though it permits corporate ownership, restricts funeral homes in possession of corporate
licenses to those whose shareholders are licensed funeral directors.  63 PA. STAT. ANN.
§ 479.8(b) (West 2010) (“[S]hareholders [must be] licensed funeral directors or the mem-
bers of the immediate family of a licensed funeral director . . . .”).
22. Hovatter, 516 F. Supp. 2d at 551 (citation omitted).
23. Id. (citation omitted).
24. Id. at 553 (citations omitted).  Furthermore, the average funeral in Maryland costs
around $800 more than the national average, part of which is due to the anti-competitive
nature of the funerary industry in the State. Id. at 554 (citation omitted).
25. Id. at 549, 554–55.  On October 11, 2006, the district court dismissed count four of
the complaint, pursuant to the defendants’ motion, which alleged a violation of the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment due to the “arbitrary and
unreasonable restrictions” imposed on the applicants’ ownership of funeral homes. Id. at
555.  The court denied the rest of the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Id.
26. Id. at 557–58.
27. Id. at 558–59.  In making its decision, the Hovatter court looked to Helton v. Hunt,
330 F.3d 242, 246 (4th Cir. 2003) (stating that there is “a strong presumption of validity so
long as [the state statute does] not discriminate against any protected class or burden any
fundamental right” (citation omitted)), and Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997) (assert-
ing that the Supreme Court will uphold legislation that is rationally related to a legitimate
end of some kind (citation omitted)). Hovatter, 516 F. Supp. 2d at 555–56.
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concluding, questioned how a permanent corporate exemption in a
skilled profession could rationally further the public’s health and
safety when permanent exemptions create an “indefinite classification
system that benefits some to the exclusion of all others,” raising seri-
ous equal protection concerns.28  The court recognized, however, that
pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, deference was due to the
Maryland Court of Appeals and thus it was not necessary to hold that
Sections 7-309(a)–(b) violated the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses.29
Finally, the district court determined that the defendants’ prof-
fered benefit, that of consumer protection, was “entirely speculative”
and thus not sufficient to outweigh the burden that Sections 7-
309(a)–(b), such “clearly anti-competitive” and “unique” statutes,
have upon interstate commerce.30  In reaching this conclusion, the
district court looked to Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,31 which states that
even where a statute regulates evenhandedly, the statute may still vio-
late the dormant Commerce Clause if the “burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local bene-
fits.”32  Though deference to the state legislature is required by the
Pike test, the court interpreted Fourth Circuit precedent, Yamaha Mo-
tor Corp., U.S.A. v. Jim’s Motorcycle, Inc.,33 and Medigen, Inc. v. Public
Service Commission,34 as giving less leeway than the defendants
suggested.35
Under this analysis, the court disagreed with the defendants’ con-
sumer protection concerns, stating that “Maryland consumers have
been negatively affected by the lack of competition resulting from the
corporate prohibition.”36  In looking at the expense of funerals in Ma-
ryland, the district court determined that the burden far outweighed
28. Hovatter, 516 F. Supp. 2d at 559 (citation omitted).
29. Id. at 559–60.  In Brooks v. State Board of Funeral Directors & Embalmers, 233 Md. 98,
113–17, 195 A.2d 728, 737–39 (1963), the Maryland Court of Appeals found that the Act
did not violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, thus directing the district
court’s decision in the instant case. See Hovatter, 516 F. Supp. 2d at 559–60 (applying Brooks
to the case at bar).
30. See Hovatter, 516 F. Supp. 2d at 563–64 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
31. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
32. See Hovatter, 516 F. Supp. 2d at 562–64 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quot-
ing Pike, 397 U.S. at 142).
33. 401 F.3d 560 (4th Cir. 2005).
34. 985 F.2d 164 (4th Cir. 1993).
35. See Hovatter, 516 F. Supp. 2d at 562–63 (describing this pair of Fourth Circuit cases
(citations omitted)).
36. Id. at 563.
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the benefit, amounting to a violation of the dormant Commerce
Clause.37
The district court subsequently clarified its decision and refused
to amend the judgment, upon the plaintiffs’ motion, holding that its
decision only enjoined the State from denying corporate rights to
those “capable of owning a funeral home in Maryland.”38  In so rea-
soning, the district court pointed to the State’s inclusion in the Act of
the requirement that a “licensed individual own or co-own a corporate
funeral home,” for evidence supporting the basis for its conclusion.39
The district court cited to North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy v. Sny-
der’s Drug Stores, Inc.40 for the constitutionality of the statutes requiring
corporately owned businesses in highly specialized fields to have li-
censed owners, despite defendants’ indication that pursuant to Sec-
tion 7-310(c) of the Maryland Morticians Act, the Board would not
mandate that a licensed individual own or co-own a corporate funeral
home.41  On appeal, the Fourth Circuit sought to determine whether
the Maryland Morticians Act violates the dormant Commerce
Clause.42
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Courts have interpreted the dormant Commerce Clause in a vari-
ety of conflicting ways, though they have always held true to one tenet:
The protection of out-of-state interests should be the focus of such
jurisprudence.43  The dormant Commerce Clause has a rather lengthy
37. See id. at 564–65.
38. Brown v. Hovatter, 525 F. Supp. 2d 754, 759 (D. Md. 2007). By contrast, the plain-
tiffs were unsure whether the district court’s decision was meant to extend the right to
obtain corporate ownership to all “non-mortician entrepreneurs and companies.” Id. at
758 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The district court refused to grant
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend because of the following reasons: (1) the plaintiffs presented
no “intervening change in controlling law” to support their request that the court require
that the defendants “allow an unlicensed individual to own a corporate funeral home”; and
(2) the plaintiffs failed to establish that a change was necessary to “correct a clear error of
law or prevent manifest injustice.” Id. at 759 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
and quoting Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998)).
39. Id. at 758–59 (citation omitted).
40. 414 U.S. 156 (1973); see Hovatter, 525 F. Supp. 2d at 758 (summarizing succinctly
North Dakota Board of Pharmacy (citation omitted)).
41. Hovatter, 525 F. Supp. 2d at 758–59 (citing N.D. Bd. of Pharmacy, 414 U.S. at 156,
166–67; MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 7-310(c) (LexisNexis 2009)).
42. Brown v. Hovatter, 561 F.3d 357, 359–60 (4th Cir. 2009).  Though the court of
appeals did not explicitly state why it elected to address this case, it indicated agreement
with the lower court as to the decisions regarding the Due Process Clause and Equal Pro-
tection Clause. See id. (suggesting that the Fourth Circuit heard this case to illustrate its
view of the dormant Commerce Clause).
43. See infra Part II.A.
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history of precedent.44  Though much is unpredictable in dormant
Commerce Clause assessment, courts seeking to determine the consti-
tutionality of cases implicating the dormant Commerce Clause apply a
three-part inquiry to determine the following: (1) what is the conduct
regulated;45 (2) whether the legislation discriminates against inter-
state commerce;46 and (3) whether the regulation imposes an exces-
sive burden when balanced against the local benefits.47
A. The History of the Dormant Commerce Clause Indicates that the
Supreme Court’s Interpretation Is Intended to Protect Out-of-
State Interests
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution gives
Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several
States.”48  Though only applicable to the federal government, the
United States Supreme Court has since 185249 interpreted the Com-
merce Clause as impressing a complementary, negative burden upon
state power to refrain from hindering interstate commerce, even in
the absence of congressional action.50  In the landmark case of Cooley
v. Board of Wardens,51 the Court first conceived of the need for a re-
striction upon state power.52  In recognizing the congressional right
to regulate interstate commerce, it noted “[i]f the States were divested
of the power to legislate . . . by the grant of the commercial power to
Congress, it is plain this [state legislative] act could not confer upon
them power thus to legislate.”53  In the century and a half since this
case, the Supreme Court has abided by its original intentions, inter-
preting legislation and cases to ensure protection of congressional
power granted by the Constitution as well as those out-of-state inter-
ests unable to protect themselves.54
44. See infra notes 48–54 and accompanying text. R
45. See infra Part II.B.
46. See infra Part II.C.
47. See infra Part II.D.
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
49. See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 318 (1851) (creating the
dormant Commerce Clause as an extension of the Commerce Clause).
50. See, e.g., Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 446 (1991) (“[T]he Court long has recog-
nized that it also limits the power of the States to erect barriers against interstate trade.”
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27,
35 (1980))).
51. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299.
52. Id. at 318–19.
53. Id. at 318.
54. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1993)
(“The central rationale for the rule against discrimination is to prohibit state or municipal
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B. An Equitable Interest in the Protection of All Goods and Services
Underlies Dormant Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
When a court hears a dormant Commerce Clause issue, it initially
classifies the conduct as a good or service.55  To do so, courts must
determine the form of the conduct or product regulated by the con-
troversial legislation.56  The Supreme Court requires that courts “es-
chew[ ] formalism for a sensitive, case-by-case analysis of purposes and
effects” because Commerce Clause jurisprudence “is not so rigid as to
be controlled by the form by which a State erects barriers to com-
merce.”57  In alignment with this principle, the Court has found that
the dormant Commerce Clause protects two categories: (1) goods, tra-
ditionally sheltered by the Clause,58 and (2) services, a more modern
expansion upon the doctrine.59  The expansion of the doctrine
reveals a need to protect out-of-state interests unable to protect them-
selves, a common thread running throughout Commerce Clause
jurisprudence.60
1. Traditional Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Seeks to Protect the
Free Flow of Goods in Interstate Commerce
From the origins of the dormant Commerce Clause in the nine-
teenth century, the Supreme Court has consistently interpreted it to
complement the power granted to Congress by the Commerce
Clause—that states may not interfere impermissibly in the interstate
flow of goods.  In Welton v. Missouri,61 the Court examined a statute
requiring peddlers of out-of-state goods to obtain a license to ped-
dle.62  The statute further imposed a penalty for a failure to procure
such a license prior to peddling goods from out of state; however, it
included no similar licensure requirement for peddlers of in-state
goods.63  The Court determined that the offensive statute amounted
to a tax on out-of-state goods and held that Congress maintains power
over commerce until the article “has ceased to be the subject of dis-
laws whose object is local economic protectionism, laws that would excite those jealousies
and retaliatory measures the Constitution was designed to prevent.”).
55. See infra note 56 and accompanying text. R
56. See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 (1994) (commencing
analysis by classifying the regulation by analogy to a tariff on goods).
57. Id. at 201.
58. See infra Part II.B.1.
59. See infra Part II.B.2.
60. See supra Part II.A.
61. 91 U.S. 275 (1875).
62. Id. at 275.
63. Id.
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criminating legislation by reason of its foreign character” because
“[t]hat [commerce] power protects it, even after it has entered the
State, from any burdens imposed by reason of its foreign origin.”64
Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that acts regulating the sale of
goods would be subject to this new negative power, the dormant Com-
merce Clause.
2. Modern Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Recognizes the Need to
Protect Interstate Provision of Services
Recent dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence demonstrates
that the Supreme Court envisions the Clause as imposing a negative
restraint upon States seeking to regulate the interstate provision of
services, in addition to traditionally viewed goods.  In the 1994 case of
West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy,65 the Court reviewed a Massachusetts
regulation requiring out-of-state milk dealers to pay a monthly pre-
mium payment for selling products in-state.66  In so doing, Massachu-
setts sought to assist in-state dairy farmers by placing a burden upon
the provision of services by out-of-state parties.67  In rejecting the
State’s argument that the State’s intent was to protect its struggling
dairy industry, the Court noted that “[p]reservation of local industry
by protecting it from the rigors of interstate competition is the hall-
mark of the economic protectionism that the Commerce Clause
prohibits.”68
More recently, in the 2007 case of United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-
Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority,69 the Court examined
county “flow control” ordinances that required county waste-hauling
businesses to bring waste to a public processing facility.70  In finding
the ordinances constitutional because of an exception for publicly-run
service providers, the Court reasoned that the residents of the impli-
64. Id. at 279, 282.
65. 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
66. Id. at 188–92.
67. See id.
68. Id. at 205.  In West Lynn Creamery, Inc., the Court looked to the situation preceding
the creation of the pricing order for context and found that Massachusetts dairy farmers
had lost considerable market share due to significant competition from surrounding states.
Id. at 189.  In an effort to study Massachusetts’s dairy industry, the Governor appointed a
Special Commission, which determined that if prices paid to the dairy farmers were not
increased “significantly” in the near future, a large number of the remaining farmers
would be forced out of business. Id.  The Court found particularly enlightening the pur-
pose and effect of the pricing order, noting that the order “enable[d] higher cost Massa-
chusetts dairy farmers to compete with lower cost dairy farmers in other States.” Id. at 194.
69. 550 U.S. 330 (2007).
70. Id. at 334–37 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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cated counties had chosen to allow their local government to provide
waste management services.71  Thus, the Court’s recent decisions rec-
ognize that services deserve equal protection under the dormant
Commerce Clause as those long-afforded to goods.  This expansion of
the original protection afforded solely to goods demonstrates the
Court’s understanding that the purpose of the Clause is to defend the
rights of out-of-state interests by ensuring that Congress alone, a neu-
tral body, retains the power to regulate commerce among the several
States.
C. Courts Conduct an Inquiry into Whether the Statute Discriminates
Against Interstate Commerce
After classifying the regulation as implicating goods or services, a
court must inquire as to whether the statute discriminates against in-
terstate commerce in any way.  The Supreme Court has dictated that
an initial analysis of the statutory language is necessary because “[t]he
central rationale for the rule against discrimination is to prohibit state
or municipal laws whose object is local economic protectionism, laws
that would excite those jealousies and retaliatory measures the Consti-
tution was designed to prevent.”72 In completing this analysis, courts
look initially to whether the statute is discriminatory on its face, which
is generally per se unconstitutional.73  In expanding upon Supreme
Court jurisprudence, the Fourth Circuit has consistently required an
additional analysis into whether the practical effects or purpose of the
regulation are discriminatory as well.74  Upon a showing of discrimina-
tion, the State bears the burden of overcoming strict scrutiny by dem-
onstrating either (1) a non-discriminatory effect upon the possible
markets affected, or (2) a dearth of other non-discriminatory
alternatives.75
1. Courts Seek to Determine Whether the Language of the Statute Is
Discriminatory
An examination of Supreme Court jurisprudence demonstrates
that statutes blatantly discriminating against interstate commerce gen-
71. Id. at 343.  The Court, in basing its decision upon the government-run-services ex-
ception to dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, stated, “It is not the office of the
Commerce Clause to control the decision of the voters on whether government or the
private sector should provide waste management services.” Id. at 344.
72. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994).
73. See infra Part II.C.1.
74. See infra Part II.C.2.
75. See infra Part II.C.3.
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erally fall into one of two categories: (1) economically protective legis-
lation, or (2) legislation in response to a threat of death or disease.76
Cases implicating economically protective statutes with prohibitive
language are rarely seen, which courts have suggested may be due to
the well-accepted unconstitutionality of legislation worded to discrimi-
nate against interstate commerce.77  Furthermore, courts have gener-
ally only upheld statutes employing discriminatory language if they
were enacted due to a threat of death or disease.78
Though rarely addressed, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on
economically discriminatory statutes clearly demonstrates the Court’s
stance on such legislation.  In 1875, the Court decided Welton v. Mis-
souri,79 in which it declared unconstitutional a Missouri statute sub-
jecting unlicensed peddlers to a fine.80  The statute defined peddlers
as those engaged in the sale of selected goods produced out-of-state by
traveling from “place to place.”81  The statute, however, neither re-
quired a license nor provided a fine for peddling the products of the
state itself.82  In so holding, the Court expressed the fear that in per-
mitting a State to exact a tax so discriminatory against the other states,
“no authority would remain in the United States or in this court to
control its action, however unreasonable or oppressive.”83
Similarly, the Court has ruled favorably in only a handful of cases
implicating non-economically discriminatory statutes, all of which in-
volved protecting the public from death or disease.  In the 1939 case
of Clason v. Indiana,84 the Court upheld restrictions on the disposition
of dead animals due to the fear of spreading diseases.85  The Court
76. See infra notes 79–93 and accompanying text.  In addition, courts have from time to R
time addressed legislation employing grandfather clauses. See, e.g., Pac. Nw. Venison Pro-
ducers v. Smitch, 20 F.3d 1008, 1012, 1015 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting in a Commerce Clause
case that “[the grandfather] clauses [implicated in the case] allow[ed] Washington re-
sidents to continue to possess and sell animals that were legally held within the state prior
to the passage of the regulations” and that the plaintiffs “failed to show that the regulations
may have impacts of federal concern [and] failed to offer evidence that could support a
finding of anything more than a minimal economic impact on interstate or foreign
commerce”).
77. See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 (1994) (suggesting
that the lack of examples of tariffs, imposing “distorting effects on the geography of pro-
duction,” in legal precedent is because they “have long been recognized as violative of the
Commerce Clause”); see also infra text accompanying notes 79–83. R
78. See infra notes 84–93 and accompanying text. R
79. 91 U.S. 275 (1875).
80. Id. at 278, 282.
81. Id. at 278.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 281.
84. 306 U.S. 439 (1939).
85. Id. at 441–42, 444.
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reasoned that the statute, permitting the interstate disposal of dead
horses only by licensed operators, was permissible as part of a scheme
to protect the public health by ensuring the prompt disposal of de-
caying carcasses.86  In upholding the statute, the Court stated, “The
mere power of the Federal Government to regulate interstate com-
merce does not disable the States from adopting reasonable measures
designed to secure the health and comfort of their people.”87
Similarly, almost half a century later in Maine v. Taylor,88 the
Court upheld a prohibition on the importation of live baitfish because
of the threat of destruction of the State’s fisheries.89  In rendering its
decision, the Court questioned whether the passage of the statute
could have been due to “protectionist intent,” noting that laws
amounting to “simple economic protectionism” remain subject to a
“virtually per se rule of invalidity.”90  The Court determined, however,
that there was “little reason” to find the State’s proffered legitimate
reason to be a sham.91  Ultimately, the Court concluded that “Maine
has a legitimate interest in guarding against imperfectly understood
environmental risks, despite the possibility that they may ultimately
prove to be negligible.”92  As a result of these cases, Supreme Court
jurisprudence indicates that discriminatory language is per se uncon-
stitutional, unless the State can demonstrate that the legislation was
passed to further a matter of public health.93
2. The Fourth Circuit Looks to Whether the Purpose or Practical
Effects of the Regulation Are Discriminatory
Due to the lack of cases involving discriminatorily-worded stat-
utes, the Supreme Court has from time to time hinted at a broader
interpretation of the purpose of the facially discriminatory test, and
the Fourth Circuit has developed a more in-depth analysis.  In the
1994 case of C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown,94 the Court
attacked the town’s argument that it did not regulate interstate com-
86. Id. at 443–44.
87. Id. at 444.
88. 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
89. Id. at 132–33, 151–52.
90. Id. at 148 (citation, internal quotation marks, and italics omitted).
91. Id. at 148–49.
92. Id. at 148.
93. The State must ensure that it meets this burden. See, e.g., Hunt v. Wash. State Ap-
ple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977) (“The several States unquestionably possess
a substantial interest in protecting their citizens from confusion and deception in the mar-
keting of foodstuffs, but the challenged statute does remarkably little to further that lauda-
ble goal at least with respect to Washington apples and grades.”).
94. 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
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merce by requiring that all waste “only” within its jurisdiction be
processed at additional cost at a transfer station to prevent unsafe
waste from flowing into the stream of interstate commerce.95  The
Court stated that the defendant-town employed “an outdated and mis-
taken concept of what constitutes interstate commerce.”96  Instead,
the Court looked to the economic effects of the legislation and deter-
mined that the town transfer facility processed both out-of-state and
in-state waste, thus indicating that the town was driving up costs for
out-of-state interests by requiring their own facility to serve as a check-
point, an impermissible restraint upon interstate commerce.97
Perhaps seizing upon this language, the Fourth Circuit, in the
1996 case of Environmental Technology Council v. Sierra Club,98 stated
that the discriminatory test, “a virtually per se rule of invalidity, applies
where a state law discriminates facially, in its practical effect, or in its
purpose.”99  The court, finding the statute blatantly in violation of all
three tests, noted that if the State implemented the offending laws,
the effect would be to “clearly discriminate” against waste created out
of state.100  Finally, turning to whether the State had a discriminatory
purpose in passing the legislation, the court found that the laws at
issue involved “an integrated and interconnected discriminatory pro-
gram”101 by which South Carolina had “attempted to isolate itself
from a problem common to [the nation] by erecting a barrier against
the movement of interstate trade.”102
In 2001, the Fourth Circuit reiterated its stance in Waste Manage-
ment Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore,103 evaluating whether plaintiffs were en-
titled to summary judgment regarding, inter alia, their dormant
Commerce Clause claim.104  In conducting an analysis of the effects of
the Virginia statute governing regional landfills, the court was guided
by the principle that “[t]he obvious focus of the practical effect in-
quiry is upon the discernable practical effect that a challenged statu-
tory provision has or would have upon interstate commerce as
95. Id. at 389.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 98 F.3d 774 (4th Cir. 1996).
99. Id. at 785 (emphasis added) (citation and italics omitted).
100. Id. at 785–86.
101. Id. at 786 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Envtl. Techs. Council v.
South Carolina, 901 F. Supp. 1026, 1029 (D.S.C. 1995)).
102. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hazardous
Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1991)).
103. 252 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2001).
104. Id. at 328–29.
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opposed to intrastate commerce.”105  As a result, the court concluded
that the plaintiffs had met their burden of showing that the enforce-
ability of two statutory provisions would “negatively impact interstate
commerce to a greater degree than intrastate commerce.”106  Regard-
ing two other provisions, however, the court found a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether they would discriminate against interstate
commerce and municipal solid waste generated out of state.107  The
parties both admitted that the statute did not employ discriminatory
language, thus the court did not address the issue.108
As to whether the State had a discriminatory purpose in passing
the legislation, the Fourth Circuit looked to a number of factors that it
recognized courts had previously viewed as “probative of whether a
decisionmaking body was motivated by a discriminatory intent,”
including:
(1) evidence of a “consistent pattern” of actions by the deci-
sionmaking body disparately impacting members of a partic-
ular class of persons; (2) historical background of the
decision, which may take into account any history of discrim-
ination by the decisionmaking body or the jurisdiction it rep-
resents; (3) the specific sequence of events leading up to the
particular decision being challenged, including any signifi-
cant departures from normal procedures; and (4) contem-
porary statements by decisionmakers on the record or in
minutes of their meetings.109
Based upon these factors, the court concluded in favor of the plain-
tiffs, explaining that the State clearly had a discriminatory purpose in
mind when enacting the legislation, as evidenced by the actions of the
governor and sponsoring senator.110  In particular, the court deter-
mined that the statements of the senator demonstrated that the Gen-
eral Assembly was far more concerned by the total volume of out-of-
state municipal solid waste (“MSW”) entering the State than that of in-
state generated MSW deposited in Virginia landfills.111
105. Id. at 334–35.
106. Id. at 335.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 334.
109. Id. at 335–36 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Cal-
vert County, 48 F.3d 810, 819 (4th Cir. 1995)).
110. See id. at 335–41.  The court recounted, in some detail, the events and statements
by both individuals leading up to the enactment of the legislation in question. Id.
111. Id. at 340–41 (explaining that the senator’s statements “unequivocally show[ed]
that the volume of MSW generated outside Virginia flowing into Virginia triggered more
concern on the part of Virginia’s General Assembly than the volume of MSW generated in
Virginia being deposited in landfills located in Virginia”).
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In 2005, the Fourth Circuit affirmed its reasoning in Yamaha Mo-
tor Corp., U.S.A. v. Jim’s Motorcycle, Inc.112  In determining the effect of
the legislation upon interstate commerce, the court used a “probable
effect” test to conclude that the plaintiffs had not introduced suffi-
cient evidence to show that the legislation would “have any probable
or discernible discriminatory effects on interstate commerce.”113  The
court also acknowledged the “purpose” element of the analysis.114  As
a result, collective Fourth Circuit precedent indicates additional con-
cerns to be considered under the facial discrimination test in the
hope of adequately protecting out-of-state interests: The purpose and
effects of the legislation allegedly in violation of the dormant Com-
merce Clause.
3. Courts Primarily Look to Two Types of Evidence Produced by
States Hoping to Survive Strict Scrutiny: The Possible Markets
Affected and a Lack of Other Non-Discriminatory Alternatives to
Advance a Legitimate Local Purpose
Courts have generally found discrimination to be per se unconsti-
tutional unless a State can “sho[w] that it advances a legitimate local
purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscrimi-
natory alternatives.”115  States have overcome the strict scrutiny re-
quired by a finding of per se discrimination in the Supreme Court by
showing one of two things: (1) the effects upon relevant markets and
the necessity of the challenged legislation,116 or (2) a dearth of other
non-discriminatory alternatives to accomplish the permissible local
objective.117
a. Courts Look at the Markets Purportedly Affected by the
Challenged Legislation to Determine Its Effects
According to this first approach, a State may try to ascertain all
affected markets and then prove the beneficial effects of the legisla-
tion upon those markets.  In the 2008 case of Department of Revenue of
Kentucky v. Davis,118 the Supreme Court looked to the specific markets
affected by the questionable statute, which permitted a tax exemption
112. 401 F.3d 560 (4th Cir. 2005).
113. Id. at 568–69 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
114. See id. at 568 (explaining that the legislation had a “legitimate general purpose,”
which was to shield motorcycle dealers in Virginia from unfair manufacturing practices).
115. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dept. of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 100–01 (1994)
(alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
116. See infra Part II.C.3.a.
117. See infra Part II.C.3.b.
118. 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008).
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solely for income derived from Kentucky bonds.119  This analysis, ac-
cording to the Court, both “confirm[ed] the conclusion that no tradi-
tionally forbidden discrimination [was] underway and point[ed] to
the distinctive character of the tax policy.”120  Rather than leading to a
conclusion in the plaintiffs’ favor, the Court determined that the ef-
fects of the statute were such that, without the current tax scheme in
place, there was “little doubt that many single-state funds would disap-
pear.”121  As such, the Court determined that the legislation was essen-
tially indispensable to the maintenance of “single-state markets
serving smaller municipal borrowers.”122  The necessity of the statute
suggested that the State’s objectives were far from impermissible local
protectionism and also explained why Kentucky kept a tax system that
scholars believed to create a net loss of revenue to the State over the
interest expense saved.123  Thus, a finding of indispensability or high
worth of the legislation weighs greatly in favor of upholding the con-
stitutionality of the statute, regardless of whether that statute fails the
per se discrimination test.
b. A Lack of Other Non-Discriminatory Alternatives May Support
Constitutionality If the Rationale Is Permissible
Although a State may attempt to demonstrate that there are “no
other means to advance a legitimate local interest,” the Supreme
Court has suggested that this is a very high burden to meet.124  In C &
119. Id. at 1805, 1815.  In classifying the market at issue, the Court looked to three
possible definitions: (1) the market for “issuers and holders of all fixed-income securities,
whatever their source or ultimate destination”; (2) “commerce solely in federally tax-ex-
empt municipal bonds, much of it conducted through interstate municipal bond funds”;
and (3) “the [market] for bonds within the State of issue, a large proportion of which
market in each State is managed by one or more single-state funds.” Id. at 1815–16.  In the
first category, the Court noted that Kentucky “treat[ed] income from municipal bonds of
other States just like income from bonds privately issued in Kentucky or elsewhere,” and
gave no preferential treatment to local issuers or holders. Id. at 1815.  In the second cate-
gory, the Court recognized that the difference between the State’s treatment of its own
bonds versus those from other states was at its greatest; however, nearly every other State
“believe[d] its public interests [were] served by the same tax-and-exemption feature.” Id.
This suggested that no State saw any impermissible advantage or disadvantage. Id. at
1815–16.  In the last category, the Court recognized that “[t]here is little doubt that many
single-state funds would disappear if the current differential tax schemes were upset,”
which weighed greatly in favor of upholding the statute. Id. at 1816–17.
120. Id. at 1815.
121. Id. at 1816.
122. Id. at 1817.
123. Id.
124. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994) (noting that
such a demonstration would only apply to a “narrow class of cases” and would undergo
“rigorous scrutiny”).
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A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown,125 the Court addressed the mu-
nicipality’s argument that a flow control ordinance, requiring that
waste passing through the area be processed and taxed at their local
plant, served an environmental interest by ensuring that waste did not
end up in harmful out-of-town disposal sites.126  The Court rejected
this argument, noting that the “central purpose” of the municipality’s
passage of the ordinance stemmed from the desire to fund their new
waste transfer facility, not from an environmental concern.127  Refus-
ing to accept the municipality’s proffered argument because genera-
tion of revenue was not a sufficient basis to allow such discrimination
against interstate commerce, the Court stated that, otherwise, “[s]tates
could impose discriminatory taxes against solid waste originating
outside the State.”128  The Court thus set the bar for this test fairly
high, suggesting that rarely would challenged legislation be deemed
constitutional solely because it would effectuate the achievement of a
permissible local interest, an understandable conclusion given the
need to protect out-of-state interests unable to speak for themselves.
D. Upon Survival of the Initial Inquiries, Courts Employ a Balancing
Test of the Benefits Against the Burdens to Ensure the
Protection of Interstate Interests
For non-discriminatory regulations, courts employ a balancing
test to ensure that the benefits to the local area are not outweighed by
the burdens upon the interstate market.  Where the statute treats all
parties “even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest,
and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, [the legisla-
tion] will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”129  In con-
ducting a balancing inquiry, courts look to (1) the effects of the legis-
lation locally and interstate,130 and (2) the acceptability of the
regulation.131
125. 511 U.S. 383.
126. Id. at 392–93.
127. Id. at 393.
128. Id. at 393–94.
129. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
130. See infra Part II.D.1.
131. See infra Part II.D.2.
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1. Courts Evaluate the Effects of the Legislation upon Interstate and
Intrastate Commerce
Courts must look to the total effects of the legislation, not merely
to the area addressed, because favoritism for in-state over out-of-state
providers of services is expressly prohibited.  In Exxon Corp. v. Governor
of Maryland,132 the Court in 1978 examined a statute prohibiting pro-
ducers or refiners of petroleum products from also owning in-state
service stations.133  In holding for the State, the Court reasoned that
although a consumer may change their source of supply from “com-
pany-operated stations to independent dealers,” the shift from an in-
terstate supplier to another supplier does not create an impermissible
burden upon interstate commerce where the regulation is otherwise
valid.134  The Court consequently rejected the plaintiffs’ argument
that the effect of the statute upon interstate commerce was impermis-
sible because it “protect[ed] in-state independent dealers from out-of-
state competition.”135  The Court stated that though consumers may
be injured from the loss of competition, “the [Commerce] Clause pro-
tects the interstate market, not particular interstate firms, from pro-
hibitive or burdensome regulations.”136  Thus, in its first discussion of
the importance of the effects of the offending statute, the Court set
forth a fairly narrow rule: Though the effects are important, legisla-
tion will only be found unconstitutional if it harms interstate com-
merce, rather than some marketers operating within interstate
commerce.
In 1994, the Court addressed the effects analysis in West Lynn
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy,137 where out-of-state milk dealers brought suit
for the monthly payment the State required them to pay in order to
sell their products within the state.138  The Court, in responding to
the State’s argument that only in-state consumers felt the effects of the
price increase, determined that the pricing order at issue had an “ob-
vious impact” on out-of-state parties rather than burdening only con-
sumers and dealers in Massachusetts.139  In so holding, the Court
determined that the effect of the pricing order was to “divert market
share to Massachusetts dairy farmers,” which unavoidably harmed
132. 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
133. Id. at 120 & n.1.
134. Id. at 127.
135. Id. at 125–27.
136. Id. at 127–28.
137. 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
138. Id. at 188–92.
139. Id. at 203–04.
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such out-of-state farmers.140  Thus, the Court has indicated a refusal to
tolerate legislation where the effects upon interstate commerce and
out-of-state dealers are far greater than those upon in-state dealers.
2. Courts Examine the Acceptability of the Regulation in Completing
the Balancing Analysis
Courts also look at the acceptability of the regulation to deter-
mine the context of the benefits and burdens alleged by the parties.
Indeed, courts endeavor to ensure that an equitable result is reached,
both for interstate commerce and individual states and municipalities.
In conducting their analyses, courts look to (1) the standard practice
in the industry,141 and (2) the legitimacy of the concern.142
a. The Standard Practice in the Industry Informs Courts’ Analyses
The Supreme Court has indicated that an examination of stan-
dard industry practices is appropriate to ensure that the challenged
legislation does not “adversely affect interstate commerce by subject-
ing activities to inconsistent regulations.”143  Starting in 1945 in South-
ern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,144 the Court recognized that “confusion and
difficulty” as well as an “unsatisfied need for uniformity” would result
from the statute at issue.145  The law in question limited the length of
trains operating in-state.146  Observing that “[if] one state may regu-
late train lengths, so may all the others,” the Court declined to permit
the law, which would potentially enable other states to pass similar
legislation and seriously hinder the flow of interstate commerce.147
The Court has not wavered from its attentiveness to uniformity.
In the 1986 case of Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor
Authority,148 the Court expressed concern that New York’s “lowest-
price” regulation of liquor would “interfere with a distiller’s opera-
tions in other States,” thus effectively forcing the distiller to change its
policies or other States to change their regulations.149  By so “pro-
ject[ing] its legislation into other States,” the Court found that New
York had “directly regulated commerce therein,” and thus the law
140. Id. at 203.
141. See infra Part II.D.2.a.
142. See infra Part II.D.2.b.
143. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 88 (1987).
144. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
145. Id. at 773–74.
146. Id. at 763.
147. Id. at 775.
148. 476 U.S. 573 (1986).
149. Id. at 583–84.
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could not be upheld.150  Therefore, the Supreme Court has consist-
ently looked to the relevant practice within an industry to determine
whether the legislation at issue would interfere with that tradition or
create conflicting regulations between states.
b. The Legitimacy of the Concern and Unavailability of a Less
Invasive Alternative Often Dictate a Conclusion of
Constitutionality
Closely tied to an analysis of the standard industry practice is the
judicial inquiry into whether the concern purportedly addressed by
the legislation is legitimate.  In so doing, courts seek to determine the
impetus for the legislation and provide support for their conclusions
in favor of the state or municipality.151  The first case to explicitly state
this concern was Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,152 in which the Court held
that Arizona could not enforce legislation prohibiting a cantaloupe
grower from transporting uncrated Arizona cantaloupes to a Califor-
nia packing plant.153  In so holding, the Court stated that a statute will
be upheld where that statute “regulates even-handedly” in accomplish-
ing a “legitimate local public interest” and the effects upon interstate
commerce are “only incidental,” unless the “burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local bene-
fits.”154  Upon a finding of a legitimate local purpose, the Court stated
that “the question becomes one of degree,” as one must then look at
“the nature of the local interest involved, and . . . whether it could be
promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.”155
The Court has consistently upheld and referred to these concerns
in cases since Pike.  In the 1987 case of CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America,156 the Court found in favor of a statute regulating takeovers
of in-state companies, holding that a State has an interest in “promot-
ing stable relationships among parties involved in the corporations it
150. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Edgar v. MITE Corp.,
457 U.S. 624, 642 (1982) (“It is . . . apparent that the Illinois statute is a direct restraint on
interstate commerce and that it has a sweeping extraterritorial effect.  Furthermore, if Illi-
nois may impose such regulations, so may other States; and interstate commerce . . . would
be thoroughly stifled.”).
151. See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 91, 94 (1987) (uphold-
ing the statute at issue and noting that the State’s interest in “promoting stable relation-
ships among parties involved in the corporation it charters” was undoubtedly reflected in
the legislation).
152. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
153. Id. at 139–40, 146.
154. Id. at 142.
155. Id.
156. 481 U.S. 69.
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charters,” and also “in ensuring that investors . . . have an effective
voice” in those corporations.157  The Court, failing to find any issues
with the constitutionality or effects of the legislation, did not reach
the issue of other, less invasive alternatives.158  The determination of a
legitimate local interest and a possible reasonable alternative thus has
long been an important part of the Court’s examination of challenged
legislation that does not fail the initial discrimination test.
To summarize, in conducting analyses of dormant Commerce
Clause issues, courts look to a number of factors established by the
Supreme Court over the past century and a half.  The Court’s jurispru-
dence has evolved to afford protection for interstate services as well as
the traditionally viewed goods.159  In conducting an initial survey of
the statute for facial discrimination, the Fourth Circuit abides by Su-
preme Court precedent in first looking at the language of the statute
and then adding its own examination of the effects of the law prior to
considering any evidence that the defendant has presented to rebut a
presumption of illegality.160  Finally, the Fourth Circuit looks at
whether the benefits outweigh the burdens inherent in the statute by
analyzing the effects upon interstate and intrastate commerce and the
acceptability of regulation.161  The Supreme Court has therefore de-
signed a court’s analysis to include a thorough inquiry of all the po-
tentially discriminatory language and effects upon interstate
commerce.
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Brown v. Hovatter,162 the Fourth Circuit affirmed in part and
reversed in part the decision of the district court, holding that the
lower court’s analysis that the Maryland Morticians Act did not violate
either the Equal Protection Clause or the Due Process Clause was cor-
rect.163  The court, however, found the lower court’s conclusion that
the Act violated the dormant Commerce Clause to be incorrect, ruling
instead that the Act did not impose an excessive burden upon inter-
state commerce.164
157. Id. at 91.
158. See id. at 88–94 (failing to find fault with the Illinois statute and thus not addressing
the issue of other permissible alternatives).
159. See supra Part II.B.
160. See supra Part II.C.
161. See supra Part II.D.
162. 561 F.3d 357 (4th Cir. 2009).
163. Id. at 359–60.
164. Id.  Judge Shedd, concurring in the judgment, concurred only insofar as the court
found the burden upon interstate commerce to be incidental and justifiable in the interest
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Judge Niemeyer, writing for the court, began by explaining that
the Commerce Clause, by creating affirmative authority in Congress to
“regulate Commerce . . . among the several States,”165 also impliedly
establishes a well-known “negative or dormant constraint” upon the
power of state legislatures to “enact legislation that interferes with or
burdens interstate commerce.”166  Therefore, the dormant Commerce
Clause seeks to prevent “economic protectionism” in states anxious to
favor their own commercial interests “by burdening out-of-state
competitors.”167
The court then explained that the analysis used to determine
whether state legislation violates the dormant Commerce Clause con-
sists of two steps: (1) considering whether the law “discriminates against
interstate commerce”;168 and (2) if no discrimination is present, ascer-
taining whether the law “unjustifiably . . . burden[s] the interstate flow
of articles of commerce.”169  As neither party contended that the Act
discriminated against interstate commerce, the court proceeded to ad-
dress the second inquiry according to the Pike test, whereby the dis-
puted law will be upheld unless it imposes a “‘clearly excessive’”
burden in comparison to the “‘putative local benefits.’”170
Judge Niemeyer first determined that the practice implicated by
the Act was that of mortuary science, an inherently local practice that
does not implicate interstate commerce in any real manner.171  Fur-
thermore, the court observed that the Act did not treat out-of-state
of the “public health, safety, and welfare by encouraging familiarity of the owner of a fu-
neral business” with the daily operations of that business and ensuring accountability. Id.
at 369–70 (Shedd, J., concurring).
165. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
166. Hovatter, 561 F.3d at 362 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citing Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 447 (1991)).
167. Id. at 363 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v.
Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1808 (2008)).  According to Judge Niemeyer, however, only those
economic harms that “unjustifiably burden[ ] interstate commerce” may be remedied by use
of the dormant Commerce Clause, as even burdensome legislative measures may be per-
missible where they are in the interest of local benefits. Id. (emphasis added).
168. Id.  If the State cannot justify the discrimination by “a factor unrelated to economic
protectionism,” the law is effectively per se invalid. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citing Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1808).
169. Id. (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Or.
Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994)).
170. Id. (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
171. Id. at 363–64.  Judge Niemeyer admitted that those engaged in mortuary science
practices did provide caskets from outside of Maryland, but insisted that the out-of-state
caskets were the only items that moved in interstate commerce and furthermore did not
implicate the Act. See id. at 364.
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individuals any differently, either by purpose or in practice.172  As
such, the plaintiffs sought principally to challenge the manner in
which Maryland authorized them to conduct intrastate business in “a
profession regulated by the State.”173  Because the dormant Com-
merce Clause purports only to protect interstate commerce, however,
the court reasoned that the plaintiffs’ claim was misplaced and thus
that the court could not appropriately invalidate the Act regardless of
any burden the law may place on the manner of Maryland’s profes-
sional practice.174
In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that the Act
neither implicated the travel of interstate goods nor distinguished be-
tween out-of-state and in-state companies, thus suggesting that it did
not violate the dormant Commerce Clause.175  Furthermore, even if it
were to conclude that the Act placed an “incidental burden upon
commerce,” the court determined that the burden would not out-
weigh the “putative benefits from the Act’s regulation” in the form of
“individual liability and therefore more direct accountability for own-
ers of funeral establishments.”176
172. See id. at 364.  The court explained that anyone, regardless of residency, may own a
funeral establishment and practice mortuary science in Maryland, so long as they meet the
restrictions concerning “education, experience, and accountability.” Id.  As evidence for
this proposition, Judge Niemeyer pointed to the fact that publicly held out-of-state corpo-
rations own over half of the grandfathered corporations in Maryland. Id.
173. Id. at 365.  The court, by reference to the plaintiffs’ statements, demonstrated that
the plaintiffs complained about the “particular structure or methods of operation in the
Maryland retail market for funeral services,” and not the burden upon interstate com-
merce. Id. at 364–65.
174. Id. at 365, 369.
175. Id. at 366.  The court found this to be consistent with the holding in Exxon Corp. v.
Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978), which was that a state law does not violate the
dormant Commerce Clause simply because it shifts business “from one interstate supplier
to another,” even if it “change[s] the market structure by weakening independent refin-
ers.” Hovatter, 561 F.3d at 365–66 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Exxon
Corp., 437 U.S. at 127).
176. Hovatter, 561 F.3d at 367.  The court admitted that Maryland does not have “exten-
sive records” detailing the intentions of the Act; however, Judge Niemeyer asserted that
Supreme Court precedent requires only the acknowledgement of a need to “promot[e]
familiarity between an owner and his business in a licensed and regulated industry” to show
a “legitimate local interest.” Id. (citing N.D. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder’s Drug Stores,
Inc., 414 U.S. 156, 166–67 (1973); Goldfarb v. Supreme Court of Va., 766 F.2d 859, 862
(4th Cir. 1985)).  Indeed, the court explained, a State has great desire to prevent the “cor-
porate form from becoming a shield for unfair business dealing.” Id. at 366–67 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 93
(1987)).  These principles, according to the court, were what the district court identified to
support the view that states should have the ability to regulate corporations with respect to
“highly skilled occupations.” See id. at 367 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Further-
more, the court asserted that the “benefit” it identified, the creation of “more direct ac-
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Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ Due Process and Equal
Protection Clause claims, finding a sufficient legitimate state interest
that survived the relatively weak standard applied to challenges to eco-
nomic regulations.177  Judge Niemeyer stated that mortuary science,
like the pharmaceutical industry, implicates a practice requiring a
high level of knowledge, which thus would support state regulation
and the encouragement of highly involved and learned owners.178  Be-
cause the court saw the plaintiffs’ case as essentially “a disagreement
with the General Assembly’s judgment in refusing to authorize a dif-
ferent structure for practicing mortuary science in Maryland,” it con-
cluded that the plaintiffs’ challenges to the licensure requirements
could not succeed with respect to the dormant Commerce Clause,
thus reversing the district court in that regard.179
IV. ANALYSIS
In Brown v. Hovatter, the Fourth Circuit found the Maryland Mor-
ticians Act to be constitutional by applying the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine with a narrow view of the type of conduct protected
by the Clause, as well as of the effects of the Act in question.180  In so
holding, the court failed to initially classify the regulated activity as a
service worthy of dormant Commerce Clause examination, creating a
dangerous and wholly unsupported new standard whereby the inter-
state travel of goods is protected but services are only sheltered when
courts deem it necessary and appropriate.181  The Hovatter court fur-
ther completely failed to address the second step, a determination of
whether the statute is discriminatory, erroneously indicating instead
that an in-depth examination of the discriminatory nature of a statute
countability for owners of funeral establishments,” was exactly the kind of liability that the
plaintiffs sought to avoid, a result that the court refuse to permit. Id.
177. See id. at 368–69 (“Because the Morticians Act is an economic regulation, we may
not strike it down unless it is wholly arbitrary, without any basis in reason.  In other words,
to survive such challenges, the Act need only be rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
178. Id.; see also id. (applying the rationale of North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy, 414
U.S. at 164–67, which explained that a rational relationship existed between professions
and limiting corporate ownership).  In North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy, the Supreme
Court determined that there was a rational relationship between the protection of the
public health and safety and the regulation, requiring that pharmacy owners be “pharma-
cist[s] in good standing or a corporation or association” where the majority of the stock
was owned by registered pharmacists active in the daily administration of the pharmacy.
Id. at 158, 164–67 (internal quotation marks omitted).
179. Hovatter, 561 F.3d at 369.
180. See id. at 363.
181. See infra Part IV.A.
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is not required.182  Finally, in the context of its balancing test inquiry
in the third step, the court’s assertion that protection should not be
afforded to this type of activity failed to recognize the effect that a
narrow interpretation would have—an imbalance between the out-of-
state and in-state interests.183
A. By Improperly Concluding that Mortuary Science Constituted a Local
Service and Thus Was Not Subject to a Dormant Commerce
Clause Analysis, the Hovatter Court Disregarded
Precedent and Created a Confusing Standard
The Fourth Circuit, in reviewing the decision of the district court,
immediately sought to classify the services that were the subject of the
law as local and intrastate in nature.184  Because the services were “‘in-
herently’” local in nature, the court determined that the lack of any
goods traveling in interstate commerce suggested that the services
were not subject to dormant Commerce Clause protection.185  In so
doing, the court effectively organized its analysis around the decision
it wished to reach rather than recognizing that the provision of funer-
ary services in Maryland is inherently local in nature because legisla-
tion prevents out-of-state parties from playing a significant part in the
industry.186  The Hovatter court’s reasoning creates dangerous and
confusing precedent both for lower courts and for otherwise unpro-
tected out-of-state interests.187
The Hovatter court neglected to consider the significant protec-
tion afforded services, instead creating a confusing standard based
upon the traditional protection of interstate travel of goods.  The Su-
preme Court has historically based its dormant Commerce Clause ju-
risprudence upon protection of the interstate movement of goods.188
182. See infra Part IV.B.
183. See infra Part IV.C.
184. Hovatter, 561 F.3d at 363–65 (“The practice of mortuary science is inherently a local
profession, typically used by relatives to have the bodies of dead family members prepared
for burial or other disposition and to provide a facility for visitation, mourning, and ser-
vices.  Indeed, other than providing out-of-state caskets, which are not in any way regulated
by the Morticians Act, the service provided through the practice of mortuary science be-
gins and ends within the State.”).
185. See id.
186. See infra notes 188–92 and accompanying text. R
187. See infra note 193 and accompanying text. R
188. See, e.g., Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 282 (1875) (“It is sufficient to hold now
that the commercial power [of the federal government] continues until the commodity
has ceased to be the subject of discriminating legislation by reason of its foreign character.
That power protects it, even after it has entered the State, from any burdens imposed by
reason of its foreign origin.”).
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Within the last century, however, the Supreme Court has extended its
interpretation of the dormant Commerce Clause to also afford protec-
tion to the provision of services by out-of-state parties.189  Thus, al-
though the Maryland Morticians Act does not regulate goods, the
State’s regulation of services falls within the ambit of dormant Com-
merce Clause protection and the court’s conclusion provides a plat-
form upon which to conduct further examination.
Secondly, the court concluded erroneously that the provision of
funeral services is an “inherently . . . local profession” and thus the Act
applied only to intrastate, rather than interstate, commerce.190  This is
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s analyses.  For example, laws in-
volving waste management, an “inherently local” matter, have been
permitted on one occasion under a narrow exception to the dormant
Commerce Clause and declared unconstitutional on the other.191
The Hovatter court’s failure to consider the statute solely because of its
“inherently local” character indicates a misunderstanding of Supreme
Court and Fourth Circuit precedent.  Even where the industry appears
to be purely intrastate in nature, the provision of services by out-of-
state persons dictates analysis under the dormant Commerce
Clause.192
189. See, e.g., Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dept. of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 96, 108
(1994) (holding unconstitutional a statute that imposed a significantly higher fee on out-
of-state waste disposed in Oregon as a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause).
190. See Hovatter, 561 F.3d at 363–64.  The court also failed to cite any precedent in
drawing its conclusion that a profession that is by nature local implicates only intrastate
and not interstate commerce. See id. at 363–65.  Supreme Court precedent indicates that
the dormant Commerce Clause applies even where a statute would appear to implicate a
profession of local sensitivity. See, e.g., N.D. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder’s Drug Stores,
Inc., 414 U.S. 156, 157–58, 167 (1973) (finding constitutional a statute that required all
applicants wishing to operate a pharmacy to be “a registered pharmacist in good standing”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  Though the Hovatter court itself relied upon this
case later in its opinion, it failed to consider that the Supreme Court’s consideration of a
local service, that of the supplying of pharmaceutical drugs, suggested that such businesses
are protected under the dormant Commerce Clause.  See Hovatter, 561 F.3d at 368–69 (fail-
ing to observe this point).
191. See, e.g., United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S.
Ct. 1786, 1798 (2007) (finding constitutional a regulation requiring that all waste pass
through the local disposal plant only under an exception to the dormant Commerce
Clause for publicly-run service providers); Or. Waste Sys., Inc., 511 U.S. at 96, 108 (invalidat-
ing under the dormant Commerce Clause a statute that imposed a substantially larger fee
on out-of-state waste disposed in Oregon).
192. See supra notes 190–91 and accompanying text.  The Hovatter court also improperly R
used its conclusion about the “inherently local” nature of the mortuary science industry to
bolster its argument that the plaintiffs were complaining of “the particular structure or
methods of operation in the Maryland retail market for funeral services . . . not about a
burden on the flow of articles of commerce across state lines.” Hovatter, 561 F.3d at
364–65.  Although this case is an example of the inability of out-of-state interests to success-
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By failing to follow or overrule its own precedent, the court left in
the dark lower courts attempting to determine the state of the goods-
versus-services analysis applying to the dormant Commerce Clause. If
the court had abided by precedent, it would have instead concluded
that in our increasingly global economy, it is becoming more common
for out-of-state persons and businesses to step into traditionally local
roles, even when the regulation implicates a traditionally local indus-
try.193 Thus, the court could have affirmed the need for protection of
these out-of-state entities that receive no representation in the legisla-
tive branches of other states and municipalities.
B. The Court Erroneously Concluded that the Act’s Grandfather Clause
Did Not Present Evidence of Discrimination Subjecting It to Per
Se Illegality, Thereby Protecting Discriminatory Legislation
The Fourth Circuit only cursorily addressed whether the Act was
discriminatory, deferring instead to the district court’s conclusion that
there was insufficient evidence of a discriminatory purpose and to the
parties’ failure to argue the point.194  In so doing, the Fourth Circuit
assumed the validity of the district court’s conclusions on the matter,
which was an error because the lower court mistakenly determined
that the Act regulated in-state and out-of-state interests “evenhand-
edly.”195  By contrast, the Grandfather Clause in the Act provides the
opportunity for morticians to own funeral homes in the corporate
form only if they were so owned in Maryland as of 1953, thus violating
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence against discriminatory leg-
fully lobby the Maryland General Assembly to change the legislation, the court incorrectly
assumed that the complaint could only be classified as challenging the regulation of the
intrastate market because the case did not implicate the travel of goods in interstate com-
merce. Id. at 364–65; see also Brown v. Hovatter, 516 F. Supp. 2d 547, 552–53 (D. Md.
2007) (discussing “Efforts to Amend the Act”).  The court based its argument upon a
flawed premise—the inapplicability of the dormant Commerce Clause to anything that
does not involve the interstate flow of goods—and, as a result, concluded that the plaintiffs
complained about a subject entrusted to the legislature. Hovatter, 561 F.3d at 364–65.
193. See Special Interview: Alan Creedy, Trust 100, WALL ST. TRANSCRIPT, Aug. 2009 (ex-
plaining that funeral homes use the Trust 100 business to either “market prepaid funerals
to their customers” or “outsource the entire program . . . so that [Trust 100] manage[s] it
from soup to nuts”).
194. See Hovatter, 561 F.3d at 363 (“[N]o contention is made that the Morticians Act
discriminates against interstate commerce, and the district court concluded that there was
no evidence of any discriminatory purpose.”).
195. Hovatter, 516 F. Supp. 2d at 562 (“The practical effect of section 7-309(a) . . . is to
prevent all corporations without an exempt corporate license from owning a funeral
home, regardless of whether the corporation is a Maryland one or not.  The Mortician’s
Act regulates evenhandedly by treating in-state and out-of-state interests the same.”).  It is
to be noted that the district court did not consider the constitutional implications of the
Grandfather Clause, but rather considered the Morticians Act as a whole. Id. at 561–62.
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islation.196  As a result, the Hovatter court relied upon faulty reasoning
at the district court level, and it did not take advantage of an opportu-
nity to protect out-of-state interests by addressing three indicators typi-
cally analyzed by courts in drawing a conclusion as to whether a
discriminatory statute can overcome the bar of per se invalidity.197
1. The Hovatter Court Mischaracterized the Language of the Statute
at Issue and Failed to Recognize the Discriminatory Effects of
the Legislation
In failing to recognize the implications of the Act, the district
court and the Fourth Circuit missed the opportunity to consider a
source of potentially discriminatory legislation—the Grandfather
Clause.  In the realm of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence,
grandfather clauses, as they apply to commerce, would appear to be a
potential source of discrimination against out-of-state interests.198  In
the instant case, the Grandfather Clause permits the continuation of
all funeral homes owned in corporate form as of 1945.199  The district
court itself pointed out the discriminatory implications, but without
recognizing them as such.200  It appears that as of the adoption of the
Clause in 1937, the ability to incorporate was unavailable to out-of-
state persons because they could not fulfill the requirements of own-
ing a Maryland funeral home without essentially moving to the
state.201  Despite these discriminatory effects essentially granting cor-
196. See infra Part IV.B.1.
197. See infra Part IV.B.2.
198. Cases have appeared to address dormant Commerce Clause issues as they apply to
Grandfather Clauses, but no plaintiff has been able to demonstrate that the clause in ques-
tion sufficiently benefits in-state over out-of-state interests, as required to meet this burden.
See, e.g., Pac. Nw. Venison Producers v. Smitch, 20 F.3d 1008, 1012, 1015 (9th Cir. 1994)
(explaining that the grandfather clauses found in the law at issue permitted State residents
“to continue to possess and sell animals that were legally held within the state prior to the
passage of the regulations” and that regarding the law in general, the plaintiffs had not
established proof that “could support a finding of anything more than a minimal economic
impact on interstate or foreign commerce”).
199. Maryland Morticians and Funeral Directors Act, MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC.
§ 7–309(b) (LexisNexis 2009).  For relevant language, see supra notes 18–20 and accompa- R
nying text.
200. See Hovatter, 516 F. Supp. 2d at 551 n.7 (“Before 1937, [when the initial clause was
adopted,] Maryland funeral homes could freely incorporate . . . .” (emphasis added)).
201. For the extensive requirements necessary to obtain a Maryland funerary services
provider license and a discussion of the difficulty of fulfilling them as an out-of-state citi-
zen, see infra notes 227–30 and accompanying text.  The plaintiffs also made the argument R
that the Grandfather Clause and ban on corporate ownership was “tantamount to an un-
constitutional residency requirement,” which the Supreme Court has consistently held to
be unconstitutional.  Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dis-
miss at 20–21, Hovatter, 516 F. Supp. 2d 547 (No. 1:06-CV-00524-RDB) (citing cases).
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porate licensure solely to Maryland funeral home operators, the dis-
trict court and Fourth Circuit effectively disposed of the plaintiffs’
arguments on this point.202
In contrast to the scant attention paid to the Grandfather Clause
by the Hovatter courts, precedent suggests that the Fourth Circuit
looks unfavorably upon statutes with discriminatory effects.203 Where
a statute is challenged under the dormant Commerce Clause, courts
must complete an analysis extending beyond the potentially discrimi-
natory language and look to the effects of the statute as well.204 In
considering the Morticians Act, the district court characterized the
legislation as regulating “evenhandedly” by focusing on the Act’s ef-
fective prohibition of corporate funeral homes—regardless of the
state of origin—if not in existence in the corporate form as of 1945.205
The court’s analysis ignores the implications of the Grandfather
Clause and the fact that essentially the only funeral homes able to
obtain corporate licenses prior to 1945 were Maryland corpora-
tions,206 thus skewing in favor of in-state interests from the very incep-
tion of the rule. By failing to consider the implications of the
Grandfather Clause, the Hovatter courts disregarded years of prece-
dent suggesting that courts must inquire as to the language, effects,
202. See Brown v. Hovatter, 561 F.3d 357, 363 (4th Cir. 2009) (“In this case, no conten-
tion is made that the Morticians Act discriminates against interstate commerce, and the
district court concluded that there was no evidence of any discriminatory purpose.”);
Hovatter, 516 F. Supp. 2d at 561–62 (“There is no question that the Morticians Act, and
especially the provision restricting corporate ownership, is at minimum a protectionist
piece of legislation.  The Morticians Act does not, however, ‘negatively impact interstate
commerce to a greater degree than intrastate commerce.’” (citations omitted)).
203. See, e.g., Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 335 (4th Cir. 2001)
(“The obvious focus of the practical effect inquiry is upon the discernable practical effect
that a challenged statutory provision has or would have upon interstate commerce as op-
posed to intrastate commerce. . . .  [Plaintiffs have shown that certain provisions at issue], if
enforced, would negatively impact interstate commerce to a greater degree than intrastate
commerce . . . .  Defendants have not created a genuine issue of material fact on the
issue.”).
204. See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 194–96 (1994) (“Massa-
chusetts’ pricing order is clearly unconstitutional. . . .  [I]ts undisputed effect [is] to enable
higher cost Massachusetts dairy farmers to compete with lower cost dairy farmers in other
States.”).  The plaintiffs in Hovatter attempted to analogize its case to West Lynn Creamery,
Inc., but the district court summarily dismissed their argument. See Hovatter, 516 F. Supp.
2d at 561–62 (“Plaintiffs’ comparison to West Lynn Creamery . . . is . . . misguided. . . .  The
Morticians Act regulates evenhandedly by treating in-state and out-of-state interests the
same.”).
205. Hovatter, 516 F. Supp. 2d at 562 (“The practical effect of section 7-309(a) of the
Morticians Act, however, is to prevent all corporations without an exempt corporate li-
cense from owning a funeral home, regardless of whether the corporation is a Maryland
one or not.”).
206. See supra note 201 and accompanying text. R
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and purpose of the legislation.207 In so doing, the court misinter-
preted the intentions of the discrimination test, narrowly interpreting
the implications of the Act rather than policing state invasions upon
interstate commerce and the rights of out-of-state persons.208
2. The Fourth Circuit Failed to Address Criteria Typically Used by
States to Overcome Per Se Invalidity
Neither the district court nor the Fourth Circuit spoke to the in-
herently discriminatory nature of the Act’s Grandfather Clause; thus,
neither court needed to address any of the State’s arguments in oppo-
sition to the rule of per se invalidity for discriminatory statutes.209  As
a result, the courts failed to address how a State or municipality typi-
cally attempts to overcome per se invalidity—by showing a lack of non-
discriminatory alternatives.210
In looking at whether other non-discriminatory alternatives are
available, courts must look to what the purported or actual goal of the
State or municipality was in passing the legislation, and then deter-
mine whether another feasible and less discriminatory alternative ex-
ists.211  In the instant case, the true purpose of the legislation would
appear to be one of economic protectionism for Maryland funeral
homes.212  The Maryland General Assembly appears to have had two
admirable goals in mind when amending the Grandfather Clause in
207. See Envtl. Tech. Council v. Sierra Club, 98 F.3d 774, 785 (4th Cir. 1996) (“The first
tier [of dormant Commerce Clause inquiry], a virtually per se rule of invalidity, applies
where a state law discriminates facially, in its practical effect, or in its purpose.” (citation,
internal quotation marks, and italics omitted)).
208. Brown v. Hovatter, 561 F.3d 357, 363 (4th Cir. 2009) (stating that the plaintiffs
made “no contention” that the Act was discriminatory and that the issue related to whether
restrictions in the Act placed an excessive burden on interstate commerce).
209. See id. at 363–64 (addressing the scope and purpose of the Maryland Morticians
Act); Hovatter, 516 F. Supp. 2d at 561–62 (discussing the effects without acknowledging the
Grandfather Clause as to this point).
210. Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 333 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation
omitted).
211. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392–93 (1994);
Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc., 252 F.3d at 335–36.
212. The plaintiffs put forth an abundance of evidence on this point. See Hovatter, 516 F.
Supp. 2d at 554 (noting that the plaintiffs’ data included the following: (1) data from the
United States Census Bureau demonstrating that a Maryland funeral costs about $800
more than the national average; (2) a letter from various federal agencies to a delegate
indicating that “consumers would likely benefit from having increased competition in the
market for funeral home service,” and reforming the legislation would not “undermine
Maryland’s efforts to ensure that consumers are served by capable and professionally run
funeral homes”; and (3) statements that, at a minimum, fifty-one percent of funeral homes
in the United States are registered in corporate form (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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1945—to provide a benefit to all licensed funeral directors “engaged
in the business of funeral directing or embalming at the time of in-
duction into the Armed Forces of the United States during World War
II,” and also, as the State’s arguments suggest, to increase accountabil-
ity to consumers.213
Under the second part of this test, however, the court must look
to whether other legislative alternatives would have likely achieved the
State’s constitutional goal.214  Such permissible options were available
to the Maryland General Assembly; for example, Pennsylvania pro-
vides that a license issued to a corporation incorporated by a licensed
funeral director for the purpose of funeral directing remains valid
only if the corporation engages solely in funeral directing, and further
mandates that the licensed funeral director generally cannot hold
stock in any other funeral establishment unless a statutory exception is
met.215  This exemplifies one alternative available to the Maryland
General Assembly beyond permitting corporate ownership of funeral
homes solely to those in existence as of 1945.216  Thus, the Fourth
Circuit should have concluded that the Act was unconstitutional and
that no argument proposed by the State to rebut the presumption of
per se invalidity could succeed.
C. The Court Misinterpreted Dormant Commerce Clause Precedent in
Reaching Its Conclusion Under the Pike Balancing Test
The balancing test developed in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.217 as a
means for courts to weigh the benefits and burdens of a challenged
statute where the legislation demonstrates no initial discrimination for
a “forbidden purpose.”218  In attempting to find a happy medium be-
tween the interests of states and out-of-state persons, courts look to a
number of factors to ensure that the burden upon out-of-state inter-
213. See id. at 551 n.7, 563 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
214. See supra text accompanying note 211. R
215. 63 PA. STAT. ANN. § 479.8(b), (d) (West 2010).
216. For other alternatives, see, for example, ALA. CODE § 34-13-110 (LexisNexis 2007)
(“Any person, corporation, partnership, society or group owning or operating a funeral
establishment . . . may do so only through the services of a licensed funeral director or
embalmer.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-212 (West 2008) (“[N]o person, firm or corpora-
tion shall enter, engage in, carry on or manage for another the business of caring for,
preserving or disposing of dead human bodies until each person, firm or corporation so
engaged has obtained from the Department of Public Health and holds a license . . . .”).
217. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
218. Dept. of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1808 (2008) (citing Pike, 397 U.S.
at 142).
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ests does not overwhelm the benefits to the local industry.219  Given
the concern implicit within the dormant Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence that the court must act on behalf of those unable to speak for
themselves in the state legislature, including out-of-state persons and
businesses, courts tend to conduct a thorough examination of the par-
ties’ arguments with the following factors in mind: (1) the effects of
the regulation,220 and (2) the acceptability of the regulation.221
1. By Incorrectly Categorizing the Effect of the Act upon Interstate
Commerce, the Court Failed to Protect Both Out-of-State
Businesses and Maryland Residents
Unfortunately, the Hovatter court failed to analyze the Maryland
Morticians Act with a concern for the potential abuse of out-of-state
interests.222  Indeed, the Fourth Circuit should have approached this
case in accordance with Supreme Court precedent, which requires an
in-depth judicial determination of the effects of the legislation, rather
than a cursory reading of the law for the state legislature’s underlying
intentions.223
The Act notably meets the very narrow test for unconstitutionality
laid out in Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland.224  Even where a piece
of state legislation may appear to be burdensome to interstate com-
merce, the Court’s decision in that case suggests the law will be up-
held if it harms only some, but not all, businesses.225  In the present
case, the Act hinders all out-of-state parties from opening funeral
homes in Maryland, thus substantially favoring in-state interests.226
219. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (“Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental,
it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits.”).
220. See infra Part IV.C.1.
221. See infra Part IV.C.2.
222. The Hovatter court neglected to mention that suggesting that an out-of-state party
must meet the requirements of the Act’s licensure provisions is effectively stating that the
party must essentially move to Maryland. See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text. R
223. See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 188–94 (1994) (looking
to the impact of a statute requiring milk dealers to essentially pay a surcharge to sell their
products in-state in order to determine the effects of the statute upon interstate versus
intrastate commerce).
224. 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
225. Id. at 127–28 (noting that consumers may switch their business from one business
to another, but there is no impermissible burden upon interstate commerce solely “be-
cause an otherwise valid regulation causes some business to shift from one interstate sup-
plier to another”).
226. See Brown v. Hovatter, 516 F. Supp. 2d 547, 562–65 (D. Md. 2007) (finding that the
“corporate prohibition severely limits the ability of out-of-state businesses from opening a
funeral home in Maryland” given that “any person wishing to own a corporate funeral
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The language of the opinion itself demonstrates the court’s fail-
ure to conduct an in-depth analysis of the Act’s effects: “Any person—
out-of-state or in-state—may obtain a license to practice mortuary sci-
ence and own and operate a funeral establishment in Maryland.”227
In order to obtain a Maryland funeral home license, the out-of-state
individual who is not previously licensed must meet a number of re-
quirements, including a minimum one-year Maryland apprenticeship
and completion of an in-state test.228  If the out-of-state person is li-
censed, he may waive some of these requirements, but must still com-
plete an apprenticeship for 1000 hours in Maryland and earn a
passing grade on the Maryland written examination.229  Beyond that,
if the out-of-state party wishes to live outside of Maryland, he must
employ a licensed mortician to “operate[ ]” the funeral home in his
absence.230  It is impracticable to expect out-of-state individuals to
meet these requirements given that they necessitate considerable time
within the State.  Thus, though an initial reading of the statute may
suggest that it does not approach persons from out-of-state any differ-
ently from those in-state, an analysis of the effects demonstrates that
the opposite is true.
Under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Fourth Circuit
should have conducted a thorough analysis of the effects of the Mary-
home in Maryland must wait until one of the fifty-eight corporate licenses is for sale”).
Short of purchasing one of the fifty-eight transferable corporate licenses, any out-of-state
person interested in owning a Maryland funeral home must fulfill the same requirements
as an in-state resident. See infra notes 228–30 and accompanying text (explaining the pro- R
cess of obtaining a Maryland funeral home license).
227. Brown v. Hovatter, 561 F.3d 357, 364 (4th Cir. 2009).  The court added that “there
is no limit on the number of licenses that the State may issue.” Id.  This misrepresents the
ease of obtaining a license in Maryland, which appears to be at least a two-year process
when factoring in the requisite in-state internship and test. See Hovatter, 516 F. Supp. 2d at
550–51 (explaining the difficulty of obtaining a funeral home license in Maryland).
228. Maryland Morticians and Funeral Directors Act, MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 7-
303(b) (LexisNexis 2009) (requiring that the applicant satisfy the following standards: (1)
be of “good moral character”; (2) complete “not less than 1 year and not more than 2 years
of licensed apprenticeship”; (3) graduate with an “associate of arts degree in mortuary
science or its equivalent” from an accredited school; (4) pass the “national board examina-
tion”; (5) pass the relevant written and practical Maryland examinations; and (6) submit
an application and pay the required fee).
229. Id. § 7-305(b) (stating that the Board may only grant a waiver if the applicant pays a
required license fee, “[w]as a licensed mortician or funeral director in good standing in
the other state,” “[s]erves an apprenticeship consisting of 1000 hours,” and passes the Ma-
ryland written examination).
230. See id. § 7-310(c) (stating that to maintain a Maryland license, a funeral home must,
in relevant part, “be owned and operated in accordance with this title by at least one li-
censed mortician or one licensed funeral director, or a holder of a surviving spouse or
corporation license”).
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land Morticians Act.231  By only conducting a cursory examination of
the law, the Hovatter court hurt those unable to protect themselves—
the out-of-state parties desiring to open Maryland funeral homes but
with no lobbying rights within the State.  By failing to adequately con-
sider both sides’ arguments, the court created a dangerous precedent,
chipping away at the extensive analysis required by Supreme Court
precedent.232
2. In Creating Its Own Support for the Act When Examining the
Acceptability of the Law, the Court Created a Dangerous
Precedent
By essentially creating support for the Act, the Fourth Circuit ig-
nored Supreme Court precedent.  The Court requires conclusions re-
garding the dormant Commerce Clause to be based upon (1)
standard practices in the industry in question,233 or (2) the legitimacy
of the concern and unavailability of a less invasive alternative.234  By
failing to adequately consider either of these factors, the Fourth Cir-
cuit only added to the confusion surrounding dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence.
a. If the Court Had Looked to Standard Practice in the Industry,
It Would Have Determined that Corporations Are the Most
Acceptable Form of Funeral Home Ownership
In determining whether the statute in question is an anomaly or
alters the status quo, the Supreme Court has explained that one may
look to the standard practice within the industry.235  Within the funer-
ary industry, Maryland is one of only two states to prohibit corporate
ownership of funeral homes.236  New Hampshire, the only other state
that also forbids funeral home operation in corporate form, similarly
states that “[n]o corporation . . . shall be issued a license as a funeral
director,” except for “any corporation licensed prior to January 1,
231. The district court’s analysis includes a brief examination of the effects.  Hovatter,
516 F. Supp. 2d at 564 (finding that the Act “has had a ‘chilling effect’ on the ability of out-
of-state corporations to enter the Maryland market”).
232. See supra notes 222–23 and accompanying text. R
233. See infra Part IV.C.2.a.
234. See infra Part IV.C.2.b.
235. See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 773–74 (1945) (noting the “confusion
and difficulty” and “unsatisfied need for uniformity” in the railroad industry that would
result if the Court were to declare constitutional a law limiting the length of trains traveling
within the state).
236. See Hovatter, 516 F. Supp. 2d at 551 (“The Morticians Act’s restriction on corporate
ownership is unique.  The only other state that has a similar prohibition on the corporate
ownership of funeral homes is New Hampshire.”).
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1953.”237  The fact that these are the only two states to employ such
restrictions upon the ownership form of funeral homes suggests that
the Act attempts to artificially change the industry to conform to its
own guidelines.238
The Supreme Court has indicated its disapproval when there is
evidence that the state assembly may be “project[ing] its legislation”
onto other states.239  Given that such actions can create “confusion
and difficulty,” courts must be on their guard for such impermissible
activity.240  As a result, the Fourth Circuit should have looked to
whether uniformity within the industry was desirous and thus whether
an alteration to the current scheme by an individual state would ne-
cessitate a finding of unconstitutionality.241  Under this analysis, the
court should have found that, as an industry that involves a very costly
and infrequent expenditure, uniformity of ownership opportunities is
desirable so as to permit parties to have the benefits of cost as well as
the benefits of large providers.242
b. To Support Its Conclusion, the Court Constructed Its Own
Legitimate Purpose for the Act, Thereby Failing to Conduct
an Adequate Analysis
In reviewing the decision of the district court, the Fourth Circuit
held for the State of Maryland because “even if [the Morticians Act]
was considered to place an incidental burden on commerce, that inci-
dental burden would not be excessive in light of the putative benefits
237. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 325:15 (LexisNexis 2003).
238. See, e.g., Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851) (noting that
the Commerce Clause restricts states from regulating “subjects [that] are in their nature
national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation”).
239. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 583–84
(1986) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (finding impermissible the possi-
bility that “[b]y defining the ‘effective price’ of liquor differently from other States, New
York can . . . force those other States to alter their own regulatory schemes”).
240. S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 773–74.
241. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 88–89 (1987) (noting that no
inconsistent regulation among the states would result from upholding the statute at issue
“[s]o long as each State regulates voting rights only in the corporations it has created,” but
also stating that “[t]his Court’s recent Commerce Clause cases . . . have invalidated statutes
that may adversely affect interstate commerce by subjecting activities to inconsistent
regulations”).
242. In today’s mobile society, the benefits of corporations are profoundly felt, particu-
larly in an industry as sensitive as that of funerary services, as parties can trust the quality
associated with a corporate name. See 2010 Edelman Trust Barometer; Trust in U.S. Business
Rebounds Significantly at Home and Around the World, BIOTECH WK., Feb. 10, 2010, at 3795
(“[T]rust and transparency are as important to corporate reputation as the quality of prod-
ucts and services.”).
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from the Act’s regulation.”243  In so holding, however, the Hovatter
court failed to complete the inquiry stated under Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc.,244 which is that the permissibility of the extent of the burden
depends on “the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether
it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate
activities.”245
In Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,246 the Court indicated that
a regulation does not necessarily discriminate against interstate com-
merce simply because a burden falls upon some interstate compa-
nies.247  Despite the fact that the Act burdens all interstate companies,
the Hovatter court concluded that the Act did not burden interstate
commerce—making it clear that the court did not complete the bal-
ancing test and weigh the asserted benefits, but rather only addressed
the benefits of the Act.248
In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,249 while the Supreme
Court looked to the State’s interest and the potential negative intra-
state effects of shareholder legislation,250 ultimately, the Court did not
address any less invasive alternatives, noting only the legitimacy of the
State’s concern.251  Rather than conducting an analysis of the detri-
mental effects of the legislation, the Hovatter court created a broad
argument addressing benefits, tailored to accommodate favorable
precedent.252
243. Brown v. Hovatter, 561 F.3d 357, 367 (4th Cir. 2009).
244. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
245. Id. at 142.
246. 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
247. Id. at 126 (“The fact that the burden of a state regulation falls on some interstate
companies does not, by itself, establish a claim of discrimination against interstate
commerce.”).
248. See Hovatter, 561 F.3d at 367.
249. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
250. See id. at 90–91.
251. See id. (“A State has an interest in promoting stable relationships among parties
involved in the corporations it charters . . . .”).  The Hovatter court, drawing from CTS Corp.
when stating that “a State ‘has a substantial interest in preventing the corporate form from
becoming a shield for unfair business dealing,’” used the case to create a purpose for the
Maryland Act. See Hovatter, 561 F.3d at 367 (quoting CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 93).  The Hovat-
ter court’s reliance is misguided, however, as the regulation at issue in CTS Corp. reflected
the accepted corporate regulatory policy of States prescribing the powers of corporations,
whereas the corporate prohibition in the Morticians Act is one of only two in the entire
country—a far cry from a well-accepted provision. See CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 91; Brown v.
Hovatter, 516 F. Supp. 2d 547, 551–52 (D. Md. 2007).
252. For support, the Hovatter court cited to Goldfarb v. Supreme Court of Virginia, 766 F.2d
859, 862 (4th Cir. 1985), and North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy v. Snyder’s Drug Stores, Inc.,
414 U.S. 156, 166–67 (1973). Hovatter, 561 F.3d at 367 (citing this pair of cases when
observing that “the Supreme Court has recognized that promoting familiarity between an
owner and his business in a licensed and regulated industry is a legitimate local interest”).
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Had the court conducted a more thorough an analysis, it likely
would have determined that the purported local interest in increasing
accountability253 could have easily been served by multiple other op-
tions.  In keeping with other states that employ less stringent restric-
tions, the General Assembly could have required, for example, that all
corporations desirous of owning a funeral home in Maryland only op-
erate in the mortuary services industry.254  In the interest of protect-
ing out-of-state businesses and persons, the Hovatter court should not
have permitted such a weak argument about the benefits to local in-
terests and should have instead ultimately issued a decision protective
of out-of-state interests.
V. CONCLUSION
In Brown v. Hovatter, the Fourth Circuit narrowly interpreted dor-
mant Commerce Clause jurisprudence in order to reach its conclu-
sion that prohibitions in the Maryland Morticians Act against new
corporate ownership of funeral homes were not unconstitutional.255
In so holding, the Hovatter court first failed to properly categorize the
provision of funeral services as a service worthy of Commerce Clause
protection.256  The court further erred in its analysis by concluding
that the Act did not violate the discrimination test.257  Finally, the
court failed to properly complete the balancing test inquiry, determin-
ing that the dormant Commerce Clause does not protect this form of
activity.258  The Fourth Circuit must act soon to protect the diluted
interests of out-of-state parties, which, as this case reveals, enjoy little
protection from intrastate-commerce-oriented state legislatures.259
253. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. R
254. See, e.g., 63 PA. STAT. ANN. § 479.8 (West 2010) (permitting a corporate license
issued to a licensed funeral director as long as certain conditions, such as that the corpora-
tion engage only in the business activity of funeral directing, are met).
255. See Hovatter, 561 F.3d at 359–60.
256. See supra Part IV.A.
257. See supra Part IV.B.
258. See supra Part IV.C.
259. See supra Part IV.A–C.
